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Summary
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Authors: Natalia Danilina, Daniel Ferm, Fredrik Hedberg and Daniel Zakrisson
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Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to test for the existene of Capital Struture
Arbitrage opportunities in the equity-redit markets.
Methodology: The mispriing of Credit Default Swap ontrats are alulated and
used as input in an Equity-Credit market trading strategy. The returns are then evalu-
ated with a modied Value-at-Risk simulation.
Theoretial perspetives: A Merton-based strutural model, CreditGrades, is used
for redit priing and a mispriing-onvergene trading-strategy between the redit and
equity markets is implemented.
Empirial foundation: Daily quotes for the Credit Default Swap spread of 37 Eu-
ropean rms were olleted for a period of two years, as well as equity-pries for the
same period and the previous two years, used for model alibration.
Conlusions: The trading shows a statistially signiant total return of the Capi-
tal Struture Arbitrage trading strategy of 32,9%, ompared to 10,8% with pure Credit
Default Swap speulation. The equity-hedge of the strategy eetively lowers Value-
at-Risk, and thus results in a higher return, whih supports the argument for Capital
Struture Arbitrage oppertunities. The results however, are very volatile, something
that might suggest that the strategy hosen is loser to speulation than arbitrage.
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Sammanfattning (Summary in Swedish)
Titel: Evaluation of Capital Struture Arbitrage in the Equity-Credit Markets
Seminariedatum: 2007-06-07
Ämne/Kurs: FEK 582 Kandidatuppsats, 10 poäng
Författare: Natalia Danilina, Daniel Ferm, Fredrik Hedberg oh Daniel Zakrisson
Handledare: Göran Andersson
Fem nykelord: Capital Struture Arbitrage, Credit Default Swaps, CreditGrades,
Value-at-Risk, Arbitragehandel
Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att utvärdera förekomsten av kapitalstrukturarbitrage-
möjligheter mellan aktie- oh kredit marknaderna.
Metod: Felprissättningen av Credit Default Swap-kontrakt beräknas oh används sedan
som indata till en tradingstrategi. Avkastningen utvärderas därefter med en modierad
Value-at-Risk-simulering.
Teoretiska perspektiv: En Merton-baserad strukturerad modell, CreditGrades, an-
vänds för kredit-prisberäkning oh en arbitrage strategi med felprisättningskonvergens
mellan aktie- oh kreditmarknaden implementeras.
Empiri: Dagliga data för Credit Default Swap-spreaden för 37 Europeiska företag sam-
lades in för en period av två år, tillsammans med aktie-kurser för samma period samt
de två tidigare åren för användning till modell-kalibrering.
Resultat: Den totala avkastningen av kapitalstrukturarbitrage-tradingen är 32,9%
jämfört med 10,8% för enbart Credit Default Swap-trading. Kapitalstrukturarbitrage-
strategins aktiehedge sänker eektivt Value-at-Risk oh resulterar i en högre avkastning,
vilket stöder argumentet för förekomsten av kapitalstrukturarbitrage-möjligeheter. Re-
sultaten är dok myket volatila, vilken kan peka på att den valda strategin är mer
spekulering än arbitrage.
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Chapter 1
Introdution
In this hapter we introdue the reader to the subjet of this thesis. We start with a
brief bakground regarding the redit derivatives market and the argument for Capital
Struture Arbitrage. We then ontinue with a disussion around the sienti problem
motivating our researh. Lastly, we present the formal purpose and limitations of this
thesis.
1.1 Bakground
The redit risk market is the world's fastest growing nanial market, attrating everyone
from hedge funds to ommerial banks and insurane ompanies. Credit risk appears
due to unertainty in a borrower's ability to meet their ontratual obligations. It
leads to redit losses and is present in almost all nanial ativities. Nevertheless, the
researh of redit risk was non-existent two deades ago, beause of the general lak of
understanding of redit risk.
Due to the growth in the level of bankrupties during the 1990s and early 2000s, risk
management has gained inreased popularity among bankers and portfolio managers.
Their ability to quantify and manage risk signiantly improved during the years, as
the advanement in omputer tehnology provided essential opportunities to the devel-
opment of risk modeling methods. Consequently, redit risk has evolved from being an
unavoidable fator in the world of nane to an aeptable and almost preditable risk
fator.
The latest produt of the redit risk market, redit derivatives, is the most popular
new instrument for transferring redit risk. Credit derivatives are partiularly used by
nanial institutions with high redit exposure in order to hedge or assume redit risk.
A redit derivative is an OTC bilateral ontrat that permits users to manage their
exposure to redit risk. The redit derivatives market is one of today's most signiant
over-the-ounter markets. The expansion of the market has exeeded all expetations,
growing from a notional value of $5 trillion in 2004 to over $20 trillion in 2006 (British
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Bankers Assoiation 2006).
Suh a tremendous growth in the market volume has been mathed and to some
extent driven by the range of new redit derivative produts. In terms of volume,
Credit Default Swap ontrats have evolved as the most popular among them, gaining
more than half of the general outstanding volume in the total redit derivatives market.
Generally, a CDS is an over-the-ounter arrangement whih moves redit risk from one
party to another. Thus, an insurane buyer pays a periodi fee to an investor in return
for a protetion against a redit event by a referene entity. This gives investors the
opportunity to go both long and short in redit without having to hold the underlying
instrument. Despite being a ustomized over-the-ounter instrument, CDS are traded
in standardized form between a wide variety of market partiipants.
CDS ontrats are primarily used by banks and other lending institutions to insure
their nanial positions from the redit risk of the rm defaulting. However, other mar-
ket partiipants, suh as hedge funds and other speulators have begun showing interest
in trading between the equity and redit derivatives market in pursuit of arbitrage op-
portunities. Huge growth in the CDS market and the possibility to go short on these
debt positions have made a new form of trading strategy possible. This onept of trad-
ing between a ompany's dierent asset lasses, equity and debt, is known as Capital
Struture Arbitrage. It is one of the most reent hedge-fund strategies that has gained
popularity among investment banks and hedge-funds sine 2002, and is designed to ex-
ploit priing imperfetion that exists in the apital struture of the rm (Chatiras and
Mukherjee 2004).
1.2 Problem
With the reent emergene of the redit derivatives market, aademi researh and in-
dustry pratie is still developing. The huge growth of the CDS market has been the
major fator for the development of CSA strategies. CSA has been drawing more and
more attention from hedge-funds and other nanial institutes. Researh about CSA is
very limited and there is still no onsensus whether this is a protable strategy or not.
CSA has been desribed as a trading strategy that ould beome "the next big thing"
(Currie and Morris 2002), but there is lak of researh showing any evidene for this.
Those who are engaged in this type of trading are surely willing to keep their strate-
gies seret, onsequently it is very hard to retrieve information about prevailing market
strategies. These are the main problems motivating this thesis, as there is evidently no
onsensus about CSA protability. Another problem in evaluating CSA opportunities,
and one of the biggest issues for the market to solve, is that there is yet to evolve a
ommon asset priing model for the new and somewhat exoti types of redit deriva-
tives. There are numerous CDS priing models and they vary strongly in the underlying
market assumptions and priing model omplexity.
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1.3 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to test for the existene of Capital Struture Arbitrage
opportunities in the equity-redit markets.
1.4 Limitations
Sine the fous of this thesis is to evaluate CSA from an equity-redit markets perspe-
tive, we limit the study by only using the equity based strutural approah when priing
Credit Default Swaps. The CSA strategies subsequently used only fous on pure equity-
redit trading and we do not evaluate, nor ompare, our results to other strategies.
In the equity-redit trading strategy, we are only onsidering equity as a hedge and
do not onsider all-put options. Transation osts are not taken into onsideration as
these osts are hard to estimate. This of ourse aets the prot of the trade.
We limit the study by only analyzing 37 ompanies from the European market, sine
no other study fouses on this market. The rms studied are seleted randomly from the
iTraxx index, however, there are some riterias in the seletion proess. The ompanies
must be listed in the euro urreny in order to avoid problems with urreny adjustments
and urreny risks, and ompanies without suient information available also has to
be exluded.
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Chapter 2
Theory
In this hapter we present the relevant theoretial framework used as a basis for the
researh onduted in this thesis. We start by introduing the reader to the onept of
redit risk and redit derivatives, and ontinue with the relevant asset priing models
used in aademia and in the nanial industry. Lastly, we talk about the onept of
Capital Struture Arbitrage, diulties of foreasting asset volatility and risk alulation
for Credit Default Swap trading strategies.
2.1 Credit Risk
There is always an element of risk involved with debt and redit. This is alled redit
risk and is generally dened as the risk of loss due to a debtor's non-payment of a debt
or other form of redit. Institutions often use various methods to rank ompanies in
order to determine how large redit risk they will fae.
There are three things that are partiularly important for an institution to onsider
when entering into a transation that will make them fae a redit risk; probability of
default, redit exposure and reovery rate (R). Probability of default is, as the name
suggests, the probability that the ounter-party will default on its obligation, for example
not manage to repay a loan in a given time-frame. Credit exposure measures how large
the remaining obligation will be if default should our and reovery rate measures how
muh that will be possible to reover after a default.
Credit derivatives also inlude redit risk. Certain types of derivatives, like swaps
and forwards, are partiularly diult to rate sine they have an initial market value of
zero. In this ase, advaned methods are used to evaluate the redit risk ompanies are
exposed to.
2.1.1 Credit Rating
Credit rating indiates the redit worthiness of rms. The rating is determined through a
proess alled redit analysis, whih takes into aount many fators about the ompany
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being rated. The main rms that perform redit analysis are Standard & Poor's, Fith
and Moody's. The ompanies are ranked aording to a rating, usually ranging from
AAA to D where AAA is the highest rating, and D is the lowest. A rating of BBB or
above denes that the ompany's debt is rated as investment-grade while a ompany
rated below BBB has a onsiderable risk of defaulting, and its bonds are referred to as
junk bonds. The system of rating diers somewhat between the redit rating ompanies.
The redit rating proess is of high importane for ompanies, as with a poor rating
it is harder to raise debt, and the interest rate will be higher. The rating eventually also
aets the equity and CDS pries sine the ratings are onsidered valuable information
for many market partiipants. The CDS market is partiularly inuened by the redit
rating, sine the default of a ompany triggers a debt payment.
2.2 Credit Default Swap
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is the most ommon form of redit derivative, whih is
aimed to transfer redit exposure of xed-inome produts between parties. A purhaser
of the redit protetion agrees to pay a xed periodi fee (spread) to the seller of the
CDS. The redit protetion is a ontrat, whih guarantees a payout in ase a redit event
ours. Its initial value when initiated is zero, as the expeted value of the protetion
payment equals to the negative expeted value of the fee or oupon payments.
The standard use of CDS ontrats is for ompanies to hedge redit risks. If, for
example, a bank has extended debt to a ompany, they an protet themselves from
a potential default by buying a CDS. If the ompany defaults on the debt during the
speied time, the ompany that issued the CDS will pay part of the notional amount of
debt, N(1−R). In this way, the protetion buyer has eliminated the risk and transferred
it to the protetion seller, who is more willing to take it.
There has been a large inrease of speulation in the CDS market over the last years.
Sine CDS ontrats inreasingly sell diretly over-the-ounter, they an be bought and
resold at will. The buyer of protetion has a short position in redit, while the seller has
a long. Shorting a ontrat is muh easier ompared to bonds, whih is a muh more
omplex and ostly proedure.
The traded CDS volume has shown exponential growth during the last years, and by
June 2006 the notional amount of outstanding CDS ontrats had reahed $20 trillion.
The main buyers of redit default swaps are ommerial banks, but hedge funds have
also beome a major partiipant in the last years. Their share of volume in both buying
and selling redit protetion have almost doubled sine 2004. Banks have went from
about 80% of the CDS market in 2000 to about 60% in 2006 while hedge funds have
went from 10% to 30% in the same period (gures for buying protetion). Other market
partiipants are mutual funds and insurane ompanies, whih onstitutes around 10%
of the market. (British Banker's Assoiation 2006)
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2.3 Credit Priing Models
When priing general redit instruments and its derivatives, the most important pa-
rameters are the rm spei probability of default and expeted reovery rate. The
probability of default diretly impats the rm's redit spread, the premium a rm has
to pay over the risk-free interest, but also determines the CDS spread onsidering the
nature of a CDS ontrat. The reovery rate also aets the CDS spread, as the prote-
tion buyer's reimbursement depends on the dierene between the notional debt value
and the atual reovered value.
CDS ontrats are most ommonly pried using simple ash-ow valuation, with the
extra omponent of unertainty arising from the probability of default added (Hull and
White 2000). During the lifespan of a ontrat there are two ash-ows to take into
aount; the protetion buyer's quarterly premiums, known as the premium leg, and the
protetion seller's insurane payment, if and when the referene entity defaults on its
debt, known as the protetion leg. The two ash-ows are in turn properly disounted,
with respet to the probability of default that impats the expeted ash-ows, and
denes the prie of the ontrat as the sum of the two parts.
However, CDS ontrats are by denition initiated on terms that set the prie of the
ontrat to zero, making the ontrat spread the determining fator. Subsequently, this
lets us solve the ontrat spread from the disounted ash-ows by modeling what has
been the fous of most redit related researh in the past three deades - the probability
of default.
2.3.1 Strutural Models
The most important breakthrough in the eld of quantitative redit assessment, dates
bak to when Blak and Sholes (1973) and Merton (1974) introdued their famous
asset priing model, originally designed for priing equity options. The model linked
equity- and debt value to the rm's assets by onsidering a rm's equity and debt to
be all and put options on the rm's underlying assets. Merton implied that the same
option priing model ould be adapted for use in assessing redit, whih led to the use
of Merton's model as a base for an entire group of redit priing models alled strutural
models.
The strutural models are heavily linked to the apital struture of a rm, hene
the name strutural, and denes the onept of default as the event when the value of
the rm's equity falls below a ertain default barrier. The strutural models are very
attrative as the model parameters are readily observable in the liquid and transparent
equity market, as opposed to the less liquid debt market.
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Merton's Model
The model Merton originally devised to assess redit is a simple one, and assumes that
the rm has two lasses of issued seurities; equity and debt. The value of the rm's
total assets is dened as the sum of the rm's equity and debt, and it is assumed to
follow the same log-normal diusion proess as the rm's equity, most ommonly the
standard Wiener-driven Geometri Brownian Motion (GBM). The assets value an hene
be desribed by the stohasti dierential equation
dVt = µVt dt+ σV Vt dWt (2.1)
where Vt is the value of the rm's total assets at time t, µ the drift (ie. the average
asset return), σV the asset value volatility and Wt the Wiener omponent.
The key argument in both Blak and Sholes and Merton revolves around the notion
that the equity value is the residual of the rm's total assets after the debt has been
re-payed, a onept rst explored by Miller and Modigliani (1958). Intuitively, this
originates from the seniority of debt over equity if the rm was to default, where the
debtors reeive their stake before any of the shareholders would. Thus, at any time t,
the value of the rm's equity an be desribed as
Et = max(Vt −D, 0) (2.2)
where Et and Vt is the equity and asset value respetively. This simple statement
reets the ore insight of Merton and to some extent Blak and Sholes, showing that
the equity an be onsidered a all option on the rm's assets, and allows for the modeling
of equity and redit using the now famous option priing framework.
With similar model assumptions as dened by Blak and Sholes, Merton speies
an option model with the equity prie representing the option prie, and with the rm's
assets as the underlying instrument. The asset value is suitably dened by the GBM
as above, fullling the log-normal return requirements of the Blak and Sholes model.
The equivalent of the option strike prie in this ase however, is not predetermined by
an option ontrat, but rather by a default-barrier related to the future value of the
debt the rm is obliged to repay. Applied, this denes the urrent equity prie using the
Blak and Sholes model as
E0 = V0Φ(d1)−Xe−rTΦ(d2) (2.3)
where V0 is the initial asset value, Φ the umulative normal distribution funtion, X
the default-barrier (ie. the value of the rm's debt, adjusted depending on the reovery
rate), T the terminal date of the rm's debt and r the risk-free interest rate. The
parameters d1 and d2 are represented by
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where σV is the standard deviation of the rm's asset value. This elegantly relates
not only the shareholders equity risk, but also the debtors redit risk, to the rm's apital
struture. Merton ontinues by deriving the probability of default from the Blak and
Sholes model; the probability that the shareholders will not exerise their all option
on the rm's assets at time T , as
P(ET ≤ X|V0) = Φ(−d2) (2.4)
where d2 is dened as above. As a result of using the plain Blak and Sholes model,
originally devised to value European equity options, equation (2.6) also reveals that
Merton's model is not a so alled stopped model; allowing the equity prie to fall below
the default-barrier temporarily before the time T without triggering a default.
Other Models
After Merton introdued the onept of modeling redit risk using the strutural ap-
proah, several researhers has proposed modiations to the original model in order
to better estimate the probability of default, resulting in an entire group of strutural
models. One of the more ommon types of modiation relates to the diusion proess
of the rm's equity, and thus its assets, in order to more orretly model the future of
the rm in terms of volatility, jumps and other externally dened events. For example,
Cox (1975) pioneered the aademially suessful Constant Elastiity of Variane (CEV)
model, leading to an improved representation of the asset volatility, something further
developed by Atlan and Leblan (2005) among others.
Additionally, Blak and Cox (1976) introdued the rst stopped strutural model (or
First Passage Model), where default ours as soon as the rm's equity drops below the
speied default barrier, providing a more realisti alternative when modeling redit.
Other researhers has also attempted to relate fators suh as market risk, using the
Capital Asset Priing Model (CAPM) framework to the probability of default (Bohn
2000). For a summary of the dierent strutural alternatives to the pure Merton model,
we refer to either Berndt and Veras de Melo (2003) or Bohn (2000).
2.3.2 Redued-Form Models
The most important alternative redit assessment method to the strutural models, is
a group of models alled redued-form. The redued-form models was rst suggested by
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Due and Singleton (1998) and deviates from the strutural models by using a time-
dependent default barrier, deoupling the probability of default from the rm's apital
struture. Having the probability of default exogenously dened provides more freedom
in the sense that non-eonomi fators an be addressed, but also inurs a larger error
margin when using model parameters not generally well understood (Bohn 2000).
Most ommonly in redued-form models, the probability of default is estimated using
market observed redit spreads from the debt market (Hull and White 2000). This is
generally onsidered a good approah sine the observed redit spread is supposedly
reeting non-eonomi default aeting fators in a quantitative way. However, beause
of the low liquidity, high redit-spread volatility and lak of transpareny in the debt
market, it's not an approah entirely without its share of ontroversies.
2.3.3 Commerial Variants
As a result of the extreme growth seen in the redit derivatives market during the
last ouple of years, researh related to redit priing model has attrated inreasing
interest from the nanial industry. As many of the redit priing models devised in
aademia tend to take a very theoretial approah to solving pratial problems, several
ommerial variants of the more suessful models have emerged.
The most popular ommerial redit priing model of those publily available is the
CreditGrades model, rivaled only by Moody's KVM, and is one of the few ommerial
models that is published in its entirety.
The CreditGrades Model
The CreditGrades model was developed and published by a joint-venture between Gold-
man Sahs, J.P. Morgan and Deutshe Bank, named RiskMetris Group, In. The model
is a modied implementation of Merton's strutural model and is widely onsidered to
be the industry standard framework used for redit assessment (Yu 2005).
As one of the main goals of the model was to address the deated redit spreads
that resulted from Merton's model, RiskMetris (2002) nd that the deated spreads
mainly an be seen as a onsequene of two fators; rstly that Merton's model allows
for the equity to pass the default barrier without triggering an atual default (ie. not a
stopped model) and seondly the lak of absolute realism in the pure GBM proess used
to model the asset development.
The CreditGrades model deviate from Merton's model by introduing an absorbing
and unertain default-barrier, and by triggering default as a stopped-model. The default-
barrier is estimated by the rm's spei reovery-rate R as in most other strutural
models, but also assumes that it is log-normally distributed over time with a ertain
standard deviation λ in order to adjust for the lak of jumps and other anomalies in the
GBM proess.
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The model uses the onept of survival probability instead of the probability of
default (whih are oneptual equivalents, although not mathematially), and is given
by
P(τ ≤ T |V0) = Φ
(
−At
2
+
log (d)
At
)
− dΦ
(
−At
2
− log(d)
At
)
(2.5)
where τ is the time of default, T the ontrat lifespan and Φ the umulative normal
distribution funtion. The variables d and At are dened in the CreditGrades model as
d =
V0
RD
eλ
2
At =
√
σ2V t+ λ
2
where V0 is the initial asset value, σV the asset value volatility, D the debt-per-share,
R the reovery-rate and λ the perentage standard deviation of the default-barrier. The
total asset value and its standard deviation is approximated in a linear fashion from the
rm's equity value and volatility (RiskMetris 2005).
Disounting the two CDS ontrat ash-ows, Yu (2005) illustrates how the CDS
spread an be alulated by solving the priing integrals analytially. The spread is
alulated as
s = r(1−R) 1− p(0) + h(T )
p(0)− p(T )e−rT − h(T ) (2.6)
where R is the reovery rate, T the ontrat lifespan, p(t) the survival probability
and r the risk-free treasury bond interest. With ξ = λ2/σ2, h(t) and g(t) are helper
funtions dened by the CreditGrades speiation as
h(t) = erξ [g(t+ ξ)− g(ξ)]
g(t) = d(z+
1
2
)Φ
(
− log(d)
σ
√
t
− zσ
√
t
)
+ d(−z+
1
2
)Φ
(
log(d)
σ
√
t
+ zσ
√
t
)
where d is dened as above. For a more in-depth review of the assumptions, ideas
and alulations behind the CreditGrades model, we refer to either RiskMetris (2002)
or Yu (2005).
2.4 Volatility Measures
Modeling and foreasting stok market volatility has been the subjet of a great researh
during the last deade. It is probably the most important variable in any priing model.
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Expetations about future volatility play an important role in portfolio management,
hedging and asset priing. Volatility is often used as a rude measure of the total risk
of apital assets.
There are numerous methods for estimating volatility in modern redit derivatives
market. Asset prie volatility is usually measured in two ways; histori volatility, whih
involves only histori prie information, and implied volatility whih represents the
volatility of the seurity underlying an option, determined by the prie of the option.
The standard model for volatility is the historial estimate, whih involves alulating
the standard deviation of returns over some historial period. The historial volatility is
the input to options priing models, although there is a growing body of evidene sug-
gesting that the use of volatility predited from more sophistiated time series models
will lead to more aurate option valuations (Chu and Freund, 1996).
2.5 Capital Struture Arbitrage
Capital Struture Arbitrage (CSA) is an arbitrage strategy for investing in two dierent
asset lasses that referene the same entity. Investors prots by exploiting the mispriing
between the two dierene assets. The two asset lasses are orrelated and arbitrage
possibilities arise from imperfetions in the interation between market and redit risk.
Before the development of CDS, it was not possible to short debt in a onvenient way, but
with the emergene of the CDS market, arbitrage strategies like this beame muh more
onvenient. Consequently, CSA has beome an inreasingly popular trading strategy
for banks, hedge funds and other speulative market partiipants. The number of funds
using this strategy has shown explosive growth during reent years (Currie and Morris
2002). The three most important CSA strategies are ommonly dened (Berndt and
Veras de Melo 2003) as trading between; equity- and debt-markets, equity- and redit-
markets and redit- and debt-markets.
The mispriing of debt is ommonly analyzed with a strutural model in order to
evaluate if the CDS spread is under- or overpried. When the CDS spread predited
by the strutural model is lower than the market spread, an investor an take a short
position in a CDS with the belief that the two markets are onverging. If this is the
ase, the spread will go down and the investor will prot from the short CDS position.
We are only fousing on the equity-redit markets strategies in our investigation.
As previous researh states, it is diult to nd appropriate trading strategies that are
used in the market, whih is a onsequene of a new emerging market, and the banks'
inentives of keeping their prot strategies seret.
2.5.1 Hedging Credit Default Swaps
Hedging nanial positions is used to lower the risk by avoiding exposure of dierent
types of risks suh as prie movements, volatility and interest rate hanges. The CDS
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position is hedged in order to lower the risk of hange in the CDS spread. There are
a number of dierent types of hedging alternatives that an be used to hedge CDS po-
sitions, and of the most ommonly used hedging strategies is the delta hedge, whih
removes the risk of prie movements in the underlying position, in this ase the CDS
spread. Delta measures the relative movement of the underlying position. A hedge is
delta neutral when both positions oset eah other and the prot of the long position
equals the loss of the short position. The position is only delta neutral for small move-
ments of the underlying position and the hedge must be rebalaned to sustain delta
neutral when large movements our.
A position in both stoks and stok options an be more appropriate to hedge for
dierent types of risks, but in this thesis we will limit our strategy to only onsider going
short or long in stoks. This limits the hedge, espeially as the equity volatility is not
diretly hedged. The prots from the hedging strategy is aeted by the transation
osts of the instruments and a hedge with ne time intervals is less protable beause
of these inreasing osts.
2.5.2 Equity-Credit Markets Strategies
The equity-redit strategy is based on a position in both CDS ontrats and equity
referening the same rm. The equity position is seen as a hedge, but sometimes market
onditions allow for prots in both positions. With a long position in a CDS (bought
protetion) ontrat, the osetting position is to buy equity, and vie versa if CDS is sold;
equity should be sold as a hedge. The logi behind this is that taking a long position in a
CDS is buying protetion of default, having a negative view on that partiular ompany
and as a hedge you must take the opposite position, buying equity.
CDS spreads are viewed as an inreasing funtion of equity volatility and leverage
(Merril Lynh 2003). With inreasing equity volatility the CDS spread inreases, and a
high volatility motivates buying protetion. In a study by Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2005),
empirial results is presented that the volatility risk predits as muh as 50 perent of
the CDS spread. This highlights the great importane of equity volatility regarding
CDS spreads. Aording to the equity option volatility smile, the true volatility of
equity is a dereasing funtion of the equity prie. A high equity volatility implies a
higher risk of default, when equity prie inreases the leverage dereases. The equity
beomes less exposed to risk and a lower equity volatility is motivated. There is a long
run relationship between the CDS spreads and the orresponding equity volatility skew.
(Berndt and Veras de Melo 2003). In the long run, the CDS rate and equity volatility
skew will revert to an equilibrium.
The prie of equity is also aeted by a large number of fators suh as maro-
eonomis and industry spei issues. The dierent harateristis of the underlying
determinants for the CDS spread and equity prie implies dierent market behavior.
This aets the trading strategy, and under ertain irumstanes a prot an be made
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in both the CDS and hedge position. In a trade with long positions in both CDS
and equity, and where the spread inreases at the same time as the stok prie, the
investor makes a prot in both positions, even though the trade should theoretially be
a hedge with the equity position. The main strategy is to arbitrage on the mispriing of
CDS ontrats, by using the onvergene argument illustrated by Fan Yu (2006). The
mispriing of CDS spreads are analyzed with a strutural approah to evaluate if its
under- or overpried, and used as input to a eventual trading strategy.
2.5.3 Other Strategies
As disussed by Berndt and Veras de Melo (2003), several other arbitrage strategies are
ommonly used other than the equity-redit one pursued in this thesis.
Equity and debt market
The most ommon form of trade with this strategy is to long a onvertible bond and
short equity, where the equity risk of the onvertible bond is hedged with the position
in equity. The onvertible bond is a more seure instrument ompared to only equity, if
the stok prie rise, the onvertible bond behaves like equity, and if the stok prie falls,
the onvertible bond is not as highly exposed to market risk as the equity position. This
strategy is a onvertible arbitrage strategy.
Credit and debt market
This trading strategy is based on the fat that the bond market regards the default
risk to be muh lower than in the CDS market, and this an be used to make prot on
the dierene of basis points between the two markets. One way is to sell CDS at a
high prie and buy onvertible bonds at a lower spread. Another word for this kind of
strategy is basis arbitrage.
2.6 Quantifying Risk
Value-at-Risk is a popular risk measure used by a large number of nanial institu-
tions. For a nanial position it is dened as the maximum loss during a speied time
period given a ertain probability. Consequently, it represents the amount to be lost
under normal market onditions. Thus, while determining Value-at-Risk, it is essential
to onsider the probability of loss and trading holding period, determined by the hori-
zon(Christoersen, 1999). Common probability values are determined by 1, 2.5 and 5
perent, whereas typial holding periods are 1, 2, 10 and 30 business days (Linsmeier
and Pearson, 1996).
Value-at-Risk is mainly onerned with market risk, but an also be applied to mea-
sure two other types of nanial risks, redit- and liquidity risk. Value-at-Risk has been
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established as the standard for risk adjustment by the most authoritative regulatory
organizations. This is ahieved due to the oneptual simpliity of the method and its
ability to work on dierent levels (ECB, 2001).
Value-at-Risk an be alulated in several dierent ways, of whih three are the
most ommon: variane-ovariane, historial simulation and Monte-Carlo simulation.
Both the historial and the Monte Carlo methods are reliable for quantifying risk in the
ase of a more omplex position. Monte Carlo approah is based on generating large
amounts of random numbers based on a statistial model. Historial simulation may
be inonvenient in ase there is not muh suient rate history, for instane for newly
developing markets. Thus, Monte Carlo approah is onsidered to be more appropriate
due to its exibility in using various parameters, suh as historial, market implied or
user-dened harateristis (RiskMetris, 2007).
2.6.1 Capital Requirements
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, hosted by the oldest global nanial
institution in the world, the Bank of International Settlements, has represented a apital
adequay framework, adopted as the Basel Capital Aord (Basel II). This framework
intends to regulate internationally ative banks' minimal risk apital requirements and is
now ratied by more than 100 ountries around the world (Evano and Wall, 2000). The
framework is aimed to provide "soundness and stability" to the international banking
system by demanding higher apital ratios and reduing ompetitive disparity among
internationally ative banks all over the world.
In order to provide greater stability in the international banking system, the reg-
ulation proess in the Basel II is onentrated around three onepts, so-alled Basel
pillars: minimum apital requirements omputed for three main risk omponents that
banks fae, redit, operational and market risk; supervisory review and market disi-
pline. In our analysis we nd it suitable to implement the rst pillar, whih proposes
various ways for determining risk weights. The "standardized approah" haraterizes a
portfolio of bank loans by a relatively small number of risk ategories, and the risk weight
assoiated with a given ategory is based on an external rating institution's evaluation
of ounterpart risk.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regulations requires nanial institu-
tions to maintain eligible apital against their market Value-at-Risk (Carling, 2002).
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Chapter 3
Methodology
In this hapter we desribe the methodology of the researh onduted in this thesis. We
start by presenting the sienti approah taken and ontinue with a desription of the
data used in our analysis. Lastly, we disuss the pratial issues and deisions regarding
the implementation of the priing model, trading strategies and risk simulations desribed
in the previous hapter.
3.1 Approah
This thesis takes a quantitative approah to test for CSA opportunities in the equity
and debt markets. In order to evaluate the mispriing of CDS ontrats, leading to
arbitrage possibilities, we build our quantitative investigation on an implementation of
the equity-redit markets strategy.
The quantitative outline of our thesis starts with the olletion of data, whih in-
ludes CDS and equity pries for 37 ompanies, as well as debt-per-share and redit
rating. Afterwards, the possible mispriings of the CDS ontrats spread are omputed
by utilizing the CreditGrades model.
In order to ahieve CSA prots we apply the trading simulation, whih is based
on the alulated mispriing results gained from our priing model implementation.
Subsequently, after alulating either prot or loss from the CDS ontrats, we simulate
Value-at-Risk in order to alulate the atual return for CDS trading strategies, whih
is done by ombining prot and Value-at-Risk.
3.2 Data
The data used in this thesis referene 37 European ompanies and was aquired from
DataStream and Reuters. Daily CDS spreads for the ommon ve year CDS ontrats
were olleted from DataStream for a period of two years, and resulted in 522 obser-
vations per studied rm. The CDS data was retrieved from the iTraxx Europe index
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Setor Firm Country Rating Equity Debt Market
Automotive Continental Germany BBB+ 103 46 14,941
Automotive DaimlerChrysler Germany BBB+ 66 152 67,342
Automotive Peugeot Frane A- 58 234 13,608
Automotive Renault Frane BBB+ 105 167 29,904
Automotive Volkswagen Germany A- 113 320 40,238
Consumer Wolters Holland BBB 23 13 7,070
Consumer Carrefour Frane A 54 53 37,994
Consumer Lufthansa Germany BBB 21 34 9,786
Consumer LVMH Frane BBB 87 35 42,634
Consumer Metro Germany BBB 59 77 19,278
Consumer Sodexho Frane BBB+ 56 41 8,894
Consumer Unilever Holland A+ 21 16 9,786
Energy Endesa Spain A 40 36 42,530
Energy Enel Italy A+ 8 7 52,369
Energy Fortum Finland A 24 11 21,547
Energy Iberdrola Spain A 42 20 48,476
Energy Union Fenosa Spain A- 43 37 12,949
Finane ABN Amro Holland AA- 36 538 68,502
Finane Allianz Germany AA- 163 2,323 73,320
Finane Capitalia Italy A 8 51 20,276
Finane Commerzbank Germany A 37 903 24,293
Finane Deutshe Bank Germany AA- 116 3,253 61,752
Finane Uniredito Italy A+ 7 77 73,610
Industrial Akzo Nobel Holland A- 60 30 17,186
Industrial Bayer Germany BBB+ 53 54 40,151
Industrial HeidelbergCement Germany BBB- 119 56 13,821
Industrial Lafarge Frane BBB 131 90 23,089
Industrial Linde Germany BBB 82 111 13,417
Industrial Siemens Germany AA- 96 71 86,239
Industrial Stora Enso Finland BBB- 14 55 11,304
Industrial Upm Kymmene Finland BBB 19 14 10,114
Teleom Deutshe Teleom Germany A- 13 19 56,882
Teleom Frane Teleom Frane A- 22 27 58,597
Teleom Nokia Finland A+ 20 3 76,925
Teleom Teleom Italia Italy BBB+ 2 5 40,158
Teleom Telefonia Spain BBB+ 17 18 82,675
Teleom Vivendi Frane BBB 32 18 36,521
Table 3.1: Setor, name, ountry, redit rating (Fith), equity prie (EUR), debt-per-
share (EUR) and market apitalization (millions of EUR) for the rms analyzed.
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whih onsists of the 125 most liquid CDS in the market.
Equity pries were also olleted from Datastream for a total of four years, two years
more than the CDS spreads. The data used was the daily lose quote from eah of
the rm's primary listing loations. We used the additional data in order to alulate
the historial equity volatility. After ombining the CDS and equity data available, our
nal per rm data sets onsisted of 522 equity prie observations for the CDS spread
period, and 523 observations for the volatility estimation period. We also olleted
debt-per-share for eah ompany, in order to model the default barrier.
3.3 Modeling
The empirial modeling performed in this thesis was implemented using the mathe-
matial software suite MATLAB and onsists of three parts; priing, trading and risk
simulation.
3.3.1 Priing Model
In order to alulate the fair equity-implied CDS spread, and in extension the model-
market mispriing, used for speulating between the equity- and redit markets, we use
an implementation of the CreditGrades model. The reasons that motivate the hoie
of using the CreditGrades model mainly arise from the model's status as the de-fato
standard priing model in the industry (Berndt and Veras de Melo 2003), as it is known
to produe aurate and reliable redit spreads. Also, the simpliity of using a strutural
model, as opposed to a more omplex redued-form model, regarding the availability of
required model data ontributes to making it an ideal hoie among the dierent redit
priing models. Lastly, sine we subsequently use the output of the priing model as
a base for our trading model, where we trade between the equity and redit markets,
using an equity-based strutural model provides a good approah in order to identify
mispriings between the two markets.
Model Parameters
When implementing the CreditGrades model, a number of deisions regarding the input
parameters must be made. The main parameters in our implementation is the equity
prie S, equity volatility σS , debt-per-share D, reovery-rate R, standard deviation of
the default-barrier λ and the risk-free interest rate r. These parameters an be divided
into market observed data (S, σS ,D, r) and rm spei model onstants (R,λ).
While the original CreditGrades model uses data from a proprietary risk database
(RiskMetris 2002) in order to estimate the rm spei model onstants, we must
instead approximate some of the parameters based on publily available information.
Though some researhers have suggested (Yu 2005) that the reovery-rate and the stan-
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dard deviation of the default-barrier an be estimated by numerially optimizing the
priing model equations using CDS market spreads, we use average reovery-rate data
from information published by RiskMetris (2002), tting the alulated CDS spread to
its market equivalent, on a per rm basis. The base parameters used are
R = 0.5
λ = 0.3
where R is the reovery-rate and λ the standard deviation of the default-barrier.
The method of tting the alulated CDS spreads is a simpliation of Yu's (2005)
numerial optimization. Initial optimization testing resulted in extreme values for both
R and λ and hene motivated developing alternative approahes. As the unmodied
implementation initially produed aurate and reliable CDS spreads in the majority
of the rms analyzed, but resulted in responsive but displaed spreads in a few ases,
we introdue a alibration onstant in order to adjust the default-barrier and thus the
relative level of the spread. The alibration onstant was estimated using Mean-Square-
Error (MSE) minimization of the alulated spread and by using market data from a
alibration period in order not to bias the trading.
Initiated Contrats
When a CDS ontrat rst is initiated between two parties, the atual prie of the
ontrat is set to zero. The ontrat spread is in hand determined by the probability
of default, and remains xed over the life-span of the ontrat. However, if any of
the parties want to get out of their ommitment before the ontrat expires, the CDS
ontrat will have an intristi value if the market CDS spread hanged sine the ontrat
was initiated.
If, for example, the market spread has inreased sine the ontrat was rst initiated,
the ontrat will have a positive value to the protetion buyer as it provides default
insurane heaper than is urrently available from the market. The protetion buyer
will thus be able to sell the ontrat to another party - and make a prot. The same
argument applies if the market spread has dereased, and the protetion seller will be
able to sell its ontratual obligation for a prot.
This idea is entral to the onept of speulating in the CDS market and is used to
determine the prie of previously initiated ontrats. Due to the fat that seondary
market CDS ontrat prie data is not available, beause of the OTC trading nature,
we need to approximate the prie of those ontrats based on the dierene between the
agreed ontrat spread and urrent market spread. This is done in line with Yu (2005)
and is essentially the equivalent of the risk-weigthed disounted spread dierene, with
the approximation that the time elapsed sine the ontrat rst was initiated is very
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small ompared to T . The hange in the present value of the ontrat, originating from
the ontrat-market spread dierene, an hene be expressed as
∆CDS(c˜, ct) ≈ (ct − c˜)
∫ T
0
1
r
e−rtp(t)dt (3.1)
where ct is the market CDS spread at time t, c˜ the agreed CDS spread of the initiated
ontrat, T the life-span of the ontrat, r the risk-free interest rate and p(t) the survival
probability as speied by the CreditGrades model. Additionally, as the prie of a CDS
ontrat at initiation is zero, the absolute value will equal the delta value of the ontrat,
CDS(c˜, ct) = ∆CDS(c˜, ct), and provides the approximated seondary-market prie of
the initiated ontrat relative to its notional debt protetion value.
Volatility Estimation
The volatility measure used in our priing model in order to foreast the equity volatility
is the 500-day historial standard deviation of the equity return. While some researhers
(Yu et al 2007) has suggested that the option implied volatility an provide important
quantitative redit information when priing redit derivatives, we base our hoie on
the mean-reversion argument for volatility due to the long lifespan of ve years for the
CDS ontrats.
Using a 500-day volatility window, and not a ve year one, is a trade-o between the
mean-reversion argument and the idea of using a shorter volatility measure in order to
better reet reent volatility hanges that may have an impat over the entire ontrat
lifespan.
3.3.2 Trading Algorithm
In the pursuit of CSA prots we devise a simple trading model based on the alulated
mispriing resulting from our priing model implementation. The trading model is based
on a portfolio of equity and CDS ontrats, both seurities referening a single rm, and
use the delta-hedge CSA approah desribed in the previous hapter. Our implementa-
tion is an extended version of the trading model developed by Yu (2005) and is based
on the argument of mispriing onvergene over time.
Trading Trigger
The triggering fator in our trading model is the theoretial mispriing of the CDS
ontrat spread. By denoting the urrent market spread ct and the alulated model
spread cˆt, we dene the absolute spread mispriing as εt = ct − cˆt. While the absolute
market and model spread value is of great importane when priing CDS ontrats in
the ase of debt insurane, the relative mispriing and its movement over time is more
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important when speulating in the equity and redit markets. We dene the relative
spread mispriing in relation to the standard deviation of the absolute mispriing as
ϕt =
E(ε)− εt
σε
(3.2)
where E(ε) is the expeted value of ε and σε its standard deviation. The relative
mispriing provides a good indiator of how over- or under-pried we think the CDS
ontrats urrently are, and is used as the algorithmi trading trigger in our model. For
example, if the relative mispriing is positive, it indiates that the market CDS ontrats
are overpried and that we should take a short position (vie verse if it is negative). Sine
a higher mispriing inrease the likelihood of onvergene over time, we adopt a strategy
where the number of ontrats held is diretly proportional to the relative mispriing
in order to ahieve a higher gearing in the ases where the mispriing is the greatest.
Number of ontrats long or short ranges between 10 to -10.
When the relative mispriing later reahes zero, the position is losed by either selling
or buying bak the portfolio omponents, depending on whether the urrent position is
long or short. The prot (or loss) realized from the losing trade will equal
∆P = ±
|n|∑
i=1
CDS(c˜i, ct) (3.3)
where n is the number of urrently held ontrats (negative if the position is a short
one), c˜i the i-th held CDS ontrat spread and cˆt the urrent market spread. The
realized prot is added umulative to our main prot indiator P and is like equation
(3.3) expressed in relation to the notional debt protetion value.
Equity Delta-Hedge
The delta-hedge strategy of hedging CDS ontrats by buying or selling the referene
rm's equity, as motivated by the CSA argument, provides a mean to redue the risk
and inrease the prot in optimal irumstanes. The size of the equity position taken is
alulated in a similar way as Yu (2005), by numerially estimating the partial dierential
of the CDS ontrat value with respet to the stok prie in order to derive the hedge-
ratio. The hedge-ratio is given by
δ(CDS,S) =
∂CDS
∂S
∫ T
0
1
r
e−rtp(t)dt (3.4)
where CDS is the value of a CDS ontrat, S the referene-entity's stok prie, T the
terminal date, r the risk-free interest rate and p(t) the rm spei survival probability
as speied in the CreditGrades model.
This hedge ratio determines how muh equity should be bought or sold to get a
delta-neutral position. In our trading model we use a more or less stati hedge, only
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re-balaning it when our CDS position is hanged, whih means that the position will
not stay delta-neutral as the underlying stok prie hanges. In order to optimally re-
balane the hedge as the stok prie and CDS ontrat spread hanges, daily trades
would inur substantial trading osts and redue overall protability. This however, is
not explored in the thesis and may still in some ases redue the risk enough to oset
the related trading osts and inrease the return.
Return Calulation
Beause the main prot indiator P in our trading simulations is an absolute measure
(although expressed in relation to the nominal debt protetion value of the ontrats
traded), it does not onsider the apital employed in reating the prot. This makes
the prot made from our trading impossible to ompare to similar trading strategies, for
example those employed by hedge-funds.
The problem arise from the fat that even though one annot pratially enter a CDS
ontrat without some sort of apital reserve, the prie of the initial ontrat is zero,
whih makes it impossible to alulate the return of CDS trading in the same manner
(log pt
p0
) as with other nanial instruments suh as equity. However, we propose using
a modied Value-at-Risk approah, in aordane to the reent Basel II regulations, in
order to produe omparable returns for CDS trading strategies.
Basel II regulates nanial institutions suh as banks, insurane rms and various
types of funds (ommon CDS market partiipants) in order to guarantee that they an
fulll their risk-dependent ontratual obligations. Thus, it an be assumed that market
partiipants would not enter a CDS ontrat agreement with a speulator, in ase he
does not meet approximately the same nanial requirements.
The nanial requirements speied by Basel II uses an n-day, 99% Value-at-Risk
model, weighted with an asset- and rm spei risk multiplier. The Value-at-Risk
horizon depends on the type of asset and the harater of the holding, and the suggested
horizon in the ase of redit derivatives is 10 days (BIS 2004). As for the risk multiplier
h, used to alulate the required apital, the suggested value varies between 1 and 4 for
redit derived assets depending on the nanial status of the holder (BIS 2004). Due
to the fat that a speulator probably is less nanially stable than any of the large
nanial institutions regulated by Basel II, we use a onservative value of h = 5 in order
to not underestimate the apital requirements.
As we now have a method of estimating the required apital reserve, the equivalent of
the apital employed in reating the trading prot P , the return of our trading strategy
an be expressed as
r =
P
hV
(3.5)
where r is the relative return, P the absolute trading prot (relative the notional debt
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protetion value), h the risk-weighted apital requirement multiplier and V the absolute
portfolio Value-at-Risk (10-day, 99%, relative the notional debt protetion value).
3.3.3 Value-at-Risk Simulation
In order to estimate the total portfolio Value-at-Risk, used to alulate the required
apital and in extension the return of our trading strategy, we take a Monte Carlo
approah to statistially estimate the trading risk. Using Monte Carlo simulations for
alulating Value-at-Risk is partiularly appealing when dealing with non-linear nanial
instruments suh as options and redit derivatives (Barkhagen 2002), as it is almost
impossible to solve the problem analytially using a parametri approah.
As we use an equity-based strutural model in our trading strategy, we assume
that equity data an suessfully alulate CDS spreads using the apital struture
link implied by Merton (1974). The same assumption an be applied in the Monte
Carlo approah when estimating Value-at-Risk for CDS based trading, where the total
portfolio risk depends on the development of both the CDS spread and the equity prie,
in order to approximate the CDS Value-at-Risk omponent based on the simulated equity
development. The iterative approah taken omprise of three sequential steps; stohasti
equity simulation, CSD spread alulation and portfolio loss estimation.
Equity Simulation
To simulate the equity development, we assume that the equity value follows a log-normal
GBM diusion proess and we model the equity prie using the disrete equivalent of
the stohasti dierential equation
dSt = µSt dt + σSSt dWt (3.6)
where St is the rm's equity prie at time t, µ the drift (ie. the average equity
return), σS the equity prie volatility and Wt the Wiener omponent.
The stohasti development of the equity is simulated using a large number (i = 1000)
of n-day random paths, and by using the historial return and volatility of the rm's
equity, at time t, to bias the distribution proess. As mentioned earlier, we use a 10-day
horizon (n = 10) for the Value-at-Risk estimation.
Subsequently, the CDS spreads for eah of the simulated n-day equity prie values
are alulated, and are used as an approximation of the future CDS market spreads.
Unfortunately, this undeniably results in model unertainty, as the priing model does
not perfetly predits the CDS spreads, whih in turn may underestimate the atual
portfolio Value-at-Risk. Using a Monte Carlo approah in onjuntion with historial
simulation, in order to alibrate the CDS spread modeling, would probably inrease the
reliability of our Value-at-Risk model. However, onsidering the limited sope of this
thesis, this is left as an interesting starting-point for further researh.
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Portfolio Loss
Using the simulated equity prie and CDS spreads, we alulate the portfolio value for
eah of the generated equity paths in order to estimate the potential loss and thus the
Value-at-Risk. This is however where we deviate slightly from the ommon pratie of
alulating the Value-at-Risk as a perentage of the total portfolio value. The reason
for this is the problem disussed above, the prie of an initiated CDS ontrat is always
zero. Instead, we estimate the Value-at-Risk in terms of the absolute loss using the total
delta-value of the portfolio, similar to the approah reeted by equation (3.3). This also
has the positive side eet that our Value-at-Risk measure shares the same dimension as
our prot indiator P , eliminating the notional debt protetion value from our trading
return.
3.4 Methodology Critiism
The ompanies used in the analysis are large ompanies with a low asset volatility and
high redit rating. The priing alulations are based on the assumption that there is a
ertain risk of default for eah ompany, whih is derived from the redit rating. Sine
these ompanies are large and stable rms, this risk might in reality be even lower than
the redit rating predits. This may be explained by several fators, suh as default
protetion and bailouts provided by the government. Sine the investors are aware of
this, and possibly at aordingly, this may alter the prie in a way not predited by the
models hosen.
The auray of the priing results are further ompliated by the fat that we do
not know the auray of the CreditGrades model in relation to other priing models.
Although the CreditGrades model has shown good results in prediting redit spreads,
there might be other more appropriate models.
Transation osts have not been aounted for in our modeling. There are a lot of
dierent transation osts for dierent types of transations, whih makes it hard to
inorporate this in the trading models. These osts are sure to aet the total return of
the trade, whih means the alulated results are somewhat higher than the results that
would be ahieved if the trading had been done for real.
We were initially planning on inorporating volatility to a higher extent in the anal-
ysis, but were unable to due to time onstraints. The results ould possibly be improved
by further inorporating implied volatility in the trading strategy. The hedge might also
be improved with options to fous more on volatility, as it an be used to predit equity
pries, and other hedging strategies, suh as gamma- or vega hedging, might provide a
better alternatives to lowering the risk and thus inreasing the return.
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Chapter 4
Analysis
In this hapter we present the empirial ndings that are the result of the priing- and
trading model simulations. We illustrate the results using a variety of graphis, analyze
the main results and omment on the most important ndings. Lastly, we test the returns
produed by our trading model for statistial signiane.
4.1 Trends
By analyzing the input data used in our model, as well as the priing output from the
simulations, a ouple of lear trends an be observed. Firstly, the equity markets has,
during the period of the data sample, enjoyed a strong positive trend with rising equity
pries and inreasing orporate earnings for most of the rms in our sample. The strong
equity markets has in turn lead to dereasing redit- and CDS spreads, beause of the
inverse relationship between equity pries and default probabilities, something further
magnied by the relatively large size of the studied referene entities.
This trend has several impliations for a CSA strategy suh as the one pursued in this
thesis. Clearly, in maro-eonomially good times, the probability of dereasing redit
spreads is greater than in a reession when using a strutural priing framework. Thus,
if maro-eonomi foreasting models were to be ombined with a priing model suh
as the one used in this thesis, a better, prediting model ould be developed, providing
leading indiators for the equity-redit mispriing.
Seondly, the output of our priing simulations, illustrated in gures 4.1- 4.6, shows
evidene of time-based lustering for the alulated market-model mispriing. As our
simulations lak a periodi omponent, the most probable onlusion to draw, is that
there are market parameters that are unaounted for in our models. Sine we assume
that the risk-free interest rate is onstant over time in our simulations, a likely laking
fator ould be the term-struture of risk-free seurities as well as the overall risk mood
in the marketplae - but also other unknown maro-eonomial fators that an prove
hard to quantify.
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Figure 4.1: CDS spread mispriing over time for the Automotive group; Continental,
Daimler Chrysler, Peugeot, Renault and Volkswagen.
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Figure 4.2: CDS spread mispriing over time for the Consumer group; Wolters, Car-
refour, Lufthansa, LVMH, Metro, Sodexho and Unilever.
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Figure 4.3: CDS spread mispriing over time for the Energy group; Endesa, Enel, For-
tum, Iberdrola and Union Fenosa.
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Figure 4.4: CDS spread mispriing over time for the Finanial group; Allianz, Com-
merzbank, Deutshe Bank and Uniredito.
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Figure 4.5: CDS spread mispriing over time for the Industrial group; Akzo Nobel,
Bayer, Heidelberg, Lafarge, Linde, Siemens, Stora Enso and Upm Kymmene.
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Figure 4.6: CDS spread mispriing over time for the Teleom group; Deutshe Teleom,
Frane Teleom, Nokia, Teleom Italia, Telefonia and Vivendi.
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4.2 Mispriing
Generally, our priing implementation provided very reasonable CDS spreads when om-
pared to market observed ones. The optimization desribed in the previous hapter, with
regard to the level of the CDS spread and the referene entity's debt-per-share/reovery-
rate, proved very suessful, espeially so in the ase of the nanial rms. Due to the
nature of the industry, nanial rms are heavily leveraged, and beause of our hoie
of priing framework, this resulted in very high CDS spreads, often an order of magni-
tude larger than what the market deemed fair. However, this is not very surprising as it
ould possibly be explained by the regulatory ontrol imposed by governments and other
non-governmental organizations world-wide, meaning that the probability of default is
atually substantially smaller than suggested by the nanial rms' large leverage. These
results are exemplied in gures 4.7 and 4.8, and most notably in the ase of ABN Amro,
where the original model spread was in the hundreds.
Further, the model spreads seems to exhibit lower volatility than the market spreads
for most of the rms. As the equity volatility for the referene rm is the prime non-
stati parameter (besides the equity prie, for whih the model spread is less sensitive),
this suggests both that the volatility used as input generally is less volatile in it self,
but also that it is lagging (as an example, see gure 4.8 and model-market mispriing)
when ompared to the volatility implied by the market CDS spread. This questions
the hoie of a 500-day historial volatility as the main volatility metri in our model,
supporting other researh (Yu et al 2007) that onlude that a more responsive (suh as
the Exponentially Weighted Moving-Average or equity-option implied volatility) metri
might prove to better model the market observed CDS spreads.
4.3 Trading
Overall, our onverging arbitrage strategy is protable, both with and without the equity
hedge. The size of the equity-positions taken in order to hedge the (sometimes highly
risky) CDS ontrats is substantial, and requires a speulator to have aess to large
amounts of apital in order to delta-hedge. Beause of the size of the equity position,
the prot (and loss) often dominates the total prot of a single lose, sine we do not
rebalane our hedge dynamially, and overall lowers the total prot of our strategy
when ompared to the one where no hedge-position is taken. The total prot, return
and Value-at-Risk for eah of the studied rms are available in table 4.1.
For 10 out of 37 rms studied, the total prot is atually higher when ompared to
the trading with only CDS ontrats, a hedge prot is made and ould be explained by
simultaneous prots from both positions. A more in-depth investigation of the our-
rene of double prots or losses has not been made in this thesis, but we refer to Yu
(2005) for a analytial disussion about the issue.
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Most of the rms studied show negative prots for the equity hedge and for 9 of
the rms it results in a negative total prot. The lower trading prot with the hedge
shows that quite substantial losses are made with the equity hedge. The premisis of
the hedge, to lower risk of the total position while having small eets on prots ould
here be disputed as the standard deviation of the prot atually inreases (from 0.26
to 0.27 with the hedge) at the same time as a quite large derease in prot is made.
A more sostiated hedging strategy, suh as gamma- or vega hedging, as well as a
dynami rebalaning of the hedge ould prove to more eetively mitigate the risk from
the trading.
However, with the equity hedge, the modied Value-at-Risk dereases signiantly
(0.09 ompared to 0.16 with only CDS speulation). This means that less apital has to
be held, whih leads to a higher mean return (54% ompared to 16% without equity),
even if the atual prot is lower. The equity hedge is highly eetive in lowering Value-at-
Risk, and thus inreasing the return. There is a statistially signiant (95% single-sided
t-test) return of 10.8% without the hedge and 32.9% with the hedge.
Figure 4.15 and 4.16 are examples where the hedge is eetive, the Value-at-Risk gets
signiantly lower if the hedge is inluded in these examples. In gure 4.17 however, the
hedge isn't that eetive. This varies between ompanies, but overall the hedge lowers
the Value-at-Risk enough to produe a higher return than a strategy without a hedge.
The implemented strategy, disussed in the previous hapter, of having dierent
numbers of ontrats in proportion to the mispriing, should serve for a more aurate
trading, limiting large losses as well as making it possible for larger prots when there
is a large deviation between the market and model spread. When a large deviation
between these two spreads our it is likely to be a longer period of onvergene and
a higher number of ontrats for both CDS and equity is long or short, whih largely
aet the prots of the trade. This is also when the largest prots or losses from the
trading ours, espeially from the equity position, as a large short position in equity
over a long period has a high probability of inurring a loss, sine the overall trend of
equity pries is inreasing.
When there is a large jump in the mispriing there is a high probability of positive
results from trading. This ours when there is a large hange in number of ontrats
bought or sold, and at the same time the hedge is hanged aordingly. There are many
reasons for the jumps, the rm might for example have liquidity problems, whih will
hange their debt struture and possibly also their redit rating. There an also be other
unknown rm variables, or hange of market onditions. The jumps are partiularly
protable beause they result in a large prot in a small amount of time, leaving more
time to make additional trades.
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Prot Return Value-at-Risk
Firm CDS Total CDS Total CDS Total
Continental 0.00 -0.43 0.00 -0.48 -0.18 -0.03
DaimlerChrysler -0.12 -0.20 -0.02 -0.02 -0.45 -0.45
Peugeot 0.20 0.44 0.17 0.79 -0.09 -0.03
Renault 0.59 0.50 0.23 1.54 -0.19 -0.03
Volkswagen -0.03 -0.54 -0.01 0.06 -0.16 -0.15
Wolters 0.04 0.23 0.01 0.05 -0.27 -0.25
Carrefour 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.07 -0.09 -0.04
Lufthansa 0.31 0.01 0.16 1.29 -0.14 -0.02
LVMH 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.47 -0.16 -0.03
Metro 0.60 0.48 0.30 1.02 -0.15 -0.05
Sodexho 0.32 -0.06 0.15 0.21 -0.16 -0.06
Unilever 0.27 0.32 0.22 1.05 -0.09 -0.02
Endesa 0.33 -0.10 0.33 1.40 -0.07 -0.02
Enel 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.75 -0.08 -0.01
Fortum 0.18 -0.36 0.06 -0.02 -0.21 -0.13
Iberdrola 0.03 -0.27 0.03 -0.61 -0.10 -0.01
Union Fenosa 0.08 -0.30 0.06 0.42 -0.10 -0.02
ABN Amro 0.35 0.23 0.66 0.71 -0.04 -0.03
Allianz 0.09 0.19 0.05 0.23 -0.12 -0.04
Capitalia 0.67 0.33 0.34 0.49 -0.15 -0.08
Commerzbank 0.26 0.16 0.45 2.07 -0.04 -0.01
Deutshe Bank 0.83 0.64 0.64 2.81 -0.10 -0.02
Uniredito 0.06 -0.18 0.06 0.53 -0.07 -0.02
Akzo Nobel -0.36 0.11 -0.23 -0.65 -0.11 -0.04
Bayer 0.30 0.26 0.16 1.04 -0.14 -0.03
Heidelberg -0.15 0.35 -0.03 -0.04 -0.38 -0.28
Lafarge 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.68 -0.15 -0.02
Linde 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.37 -0.12 -0.04
Siemens 0.17 0.43 0.17 1.63 -0.07 -0.02
Stora Enso -0.26 -0.26 -0.03 -0.01 -0.69 -0.64
Upm Kymmene 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.07 -0.09 -0.13
Deutshe Teleom 0.38 0.07 0.26 0.13 -0.11 -0.16
Frane Teleom 0.32 -0.11 0.22 0.95 -0.11 -0.02
Nokia 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.41 -0.11 -0.03
Teleom Italia 0.66 0.00 0.23 0.36 -0.22 -0.13
Telefonia SA 0.48 0.12 0.19 0.38 -0.19 -0.10
Vivendi 0.53 0.13 0.27 1.11 -0.15 -0.03
Mean 0.22 0.08 0.16 0.54 -0.16 -0.09
Standard Deviation 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.75 0.12 0.13
Table 4.1: Summary of the trading simulations; prot, return and Value-at-Risk for the
CDS-only and CSA trading strategies.
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Figure 4.7: Equity prie, equity volatility, market and model CDS spread, mispriing of
CDS spread and trading results for Metro.
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Figure 4.8: Equity prie, equity volatility, market and model CDS spread, mispriing of
CDS spread and trading results for ABN Amro.
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Figure 4.9: Cumulative trading prot for the Automotive group; Continental, Daimler
Chrysler, Peugeot, Renault and Volkswagen.
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Figure 4.10: Cumulative trading prot for the Consumer group; Wolters, Carrefour,
Lufthansa, LVMH, Metro, Sodexho and Unilever.
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Figure 4.11: Cumulative trading prot for the Energy group; Endesa, Enel, Fortum,
Iberdrola and Union Fenosa.
32
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Pr
of
it
 
 
ABN Amro
Allianz
Capitalia
Commerzbank
Deutsche Bank
Unicredito
Figure 4.12: Cumulative trading prot for the Finanial group; Allianz, Commerzbank,
Deutshe Bank and Uniredito.
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Figure 4.13: Cumulative trading prot for the Industrial group; Akzo Nobel, Bayer,
Heidelberg, Lafarge, Linde, Siemens, Stora Enso and Upm Kymmene.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
of
it
 
 
Deutsche Telecom
France Telecom
Nokia
Telecom Italia
Telefonica
Vivendi
Figure 4.14: Cumulative trading prot for the Teleom group; Deutshe Teleom, Frane
Teleom, Nokia, Teleom Italia, Telefonia and Vivendi.
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Figure 4.15: Monte Carlo simulated portfolio Value-at-Risk (99-perent, 10-day) over
time for LVMH.
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Figure 4.16: Monte Carlo simulated portfolio Value-at-Risk (99-perent, 10-day) over
time for Siemens.
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Figure 4.17: Monte Carlo simulated portfolio Value-at-Risk (99-perent, 10-day) over
time for Heidelberg.
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Chapter 5
Conlusions
In this brief hapter we summarize the researh performed in this thesis and its ndings.
We disuss the main theoretial and pratial impliations of our work and talk about
some of the shortomings of our researh. Lastly, we list some areas of researh that ould
provide interesting starting-points for further researh in the area of Capital Struture
Arbitrage
5.1 Summary
Our purpose in this thesis was to test for the existene of Capital Struture Arbitrage in
the equity-redit markets. In our analysis of 37 ompanies, we alulated a mean return
of 16% with pure CDS trading and 54% with the CSA approah, with a statistially
signiant return of at least 10.8% and 32.9% respetively. These results support our
theory of Capital Struture Arbitrage opportunities.
5.2 Disussion
It is diult to get information about the trading strategies employed by the nanial
industry, as they are not publily shared by the banks and hedge-funds using them. Our
interpretation of the equity-redit markets CSA strategy ould ertainly be improved
with more eient trading strategies.
The trading strategy does not take maro fators into onsideration. The market
has had a positive trend during the whole trading period, and it would have been a
protable strategy to just short a lot of CDS ontrats. Although there is no way of
knowing how long urrent market trends will ontinue, there might still be some maro
fators that ould be worth taking into onsideration to predit the trend and improve
the trading strategy.
There might also be trading onditions that we are not aware of. Our thesis is
theoretial in many ways, and there are usually some fators that you never think of
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until you experiene them in pratie. These unknown fators ould possibly inuene
the trading strategy, making it less eetive or even pratially impossible. Another
pratial point worth mentioning is the problem with liquidity problems in relation to
the ability to buy/sell ontrats. If any nanial problems arise during the trading, that
might hange the trading ability, and the results will thus be aeted.
5.3 Further Researh
The area of Capital Struture Arbitrage provides many interesting starting-points for
further researh as the CDS market is showing strong growth and has beome more
liquid with a growing number of outstanding CDS ontrats and market partiipants.
Researh about CSA strategies is limited and few omprehensive studies of the market
have been onduted. Even though this thesis shows some support of CSA strategies,
there is still no onlusive evidene.
The market has been positive with inreasing equity pries during the researh pe-
riod, a negative market senario with a higher volatility and dereasing equity pries
would probably produe dierent results. This would result in higher CDS spreads and
inreased volatility of mispriing, whih raises the likelihood of a higher return.
There are some ways to improve the trading algorithm, as outlined in the disussion.
This ould also be ombined with a tehnial analysis on the equity side to further
improve the strategy. Considering risk, there are Value-at-Risk alulation methods
that ould possibly alulate a more exat Value-at-Risk, one option is to use Monte
Carlo simulation with alibration using historial simulation.
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